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KANT AND SWINBURNE ON REVELATION
Kelli S. O'Brien

Immanuel Kant's position on special revelation is a matter of debate. Here I discuss Kant's position in detail and compare it to that of Richard Swinburne. I
examine both philosophers' views on the assertability of special revelation, its
contingency, whether it is necessary, the possibility of error, and appropriate
methods of interpretation. I argue that, like Swinburne, Kant finds belief in special revelation to be acceptable, even beneficial, under certain circumstances.

Introduction!
"Any religion which goes beyond the boundaries of unassisted reason is not merely gratuitous; it is also necessarily immoral." Allen
Wood on Kane
"I think that Kant regarded himself as one of those people introduced
to the pure religion of reason by the vehicle of special revelation."
John Hare3
Immanuel Kant's position on special revelation is anything but clear. His
comments on the matter appear so mixed that Allen Wood and John Hare
are able to produce ample quotations to support their radically opposing
views. In this article, I will attempt to untangle those comments and to
come to a clearer understanding of Kant's position on special revelation.
To help in that endeavor, I will be examining the views of Richard
Swinburne, a philosopher who both acknowledges his debt to Kant and is
unambiguously positive about the possibility and benefit of special revelation. Swinburne will serve as a point of comparison, a standard by
which to evaluate Kant's views.
One of the controversies surrounding Kant's views touches on his freedom to write explicitly. Kant's work was censored, and not only did he
want to have his work published, he expressed a moral obligation to obey
the laws of the state and the requirements of the censor (R 7). He would
therefore not have been free to express, explicitly, a view such as Allen
Wood attributes to him. Indeed, Wood describes Kant's comments as
"coy."4 Yet while Kant was unable to speak freely, we must assume that
what he did say, he did also mean. Arguments from silence are weak at
any stage in history. We must compose our account out of the material we
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do have, not out of what we do not.'
In the preface to the second edition of Religion Within the Limits of
Reason Alone, Kant states that revelation is able to include the religion of
reason, while the religion of reason cannot include whatever is historical in
revelation. He describes the two as concentric circles, with the religion of
reason being the inner circle. Here he, perhaps, implies that the religion of
reason is also revealed. In his lectures, he makes the statement explicitly:
"Revelation is either external or inward. An external revelation can be of
two kinds: either (1) through works, or (2) through words. Inward divine
revelation is God's revelation to us through our own reason" (LPT 160, d.
PrR 36). That is, reason is a form of revelation, what Christians often call
general revelation. External revelation is special revelation, revelation of
divine works or will in history, in a particular place and time, to a particular person or group of people.
John Hare defines "special revelation" as that part of the larger circle
which does not contain the smaller circle, the revelation of reason. 6
However Kant always speaks of a special or external revelation as something which can include the revelation of reason and as having value particularly when it incites someone to make use of reason to come to pure
concepts of God (LPT 161, R 79). Therefore, I will use the term in that
sense: special or external revelation is that which comes to humanity in a
manner other than the simple use of reason. It may contain concepts which
reason is perfectly able to derive on its own. Thus the definition consists
not of content but of the manner of its original transmission: through reason or through some other means. When I wish to refer to that part of the
larger circle which does not contain the smaller, I will use the term "historical revelation" or speak of "statutory" laws or doctrine.

1. Kant The Assertability of Special Revelation
Kant never tires of reminding his readers that the transcendental realm is
beyond the reach of experience and thus beyond our knowledge. We have
no way to know that God exists or to do more than invent concepts regarding his nature (PR 530). Kant applies this difficulty to the verifiability of
external revelation: "For if God should really speak to a human being, the
latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible
for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it
from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such" (CF 63). Even if one
were personally to hear a voice from the heavens, one cou ld not be certain.
There is always the possibility of a mistake in appearances (R 175). Kant
clearly held we could never know that a piece of purported external revelation actually is revealed by God.
On the other hand, Kant held that external revelation was possible,
within the power and rights of God (LPT 162; R 165, 122). External revelation was something which reason could neither confirm nor deny.
So how is one to respond? Allen Wood argues that Kant believes it to be
impermissible for us to accept external revelation. "We might interpret the
principle of thinking for oneself more strictly as saying that a belief is not
permissible unless it is held on grounds which actually are universally valid
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for any rational being who possesses them."7 He points out that Kant
believed there were no possible grounds for external revelation which were
universally valid. Thus, Wood concludes, "any religion which goes beyond
the boundaries of unassisted reason is not merely gratuitous; it is also necessarily immoral."8 That a belief is permissible only on appropriate grounds is
supported in Religio1l: "one cannot by any means start with unconditioned
belief in revealed propositions (in themselves hidden from reason) ... " (R
152). One may not believe willy-nilly. That is an abuse of reason.
John Hare however finds fault with Wood's strict interpretation. He
states that Kant merely argues that we cannot know a claim about external
revelation to be true. "It no more follows that we should not believe in
supernatural revelation than that we should not believe in God.'" Hare is
arguing that valid grounds for belief are more inclusive than the valid
grounds for knowledge. Surely this is correct. Kant declares that while
knowledge of God is impossible, faith in him through practical grounds is
unshakable, and moreover, necessary (LPT 40-41). We may, rather must
accept faith in God on practical grounds.
Kant did not limit appropriate belief in unknowable things to practical
belief in the ens realissimum. He holds that it is impossible for us to know
our own moral disposition, much less that of another, because this disposition is noumenal, not phenomenal. Nevertheless, with reference to the
Ideal Man, he states, "For in the absence of proofs to the contrary it is no
more than right to ascribe the faultless example which a teacher furnishes
of his teaching ... to the supremely pure moral disposition of the man himself" (R 59). That is, even though we cannot know our own moral disposition, we may ascribe the supremely pure moral disposition to a particular
person (himself the subject of purported external revelation), in the
absence of proofs to the contrary.
Surely then, something less than knowledge that God himself is speaking
to us is required for belief in external revelation. What conditions are necessary? Kant repeatedly mentions two factors: miracle and morality.
Kant frequently refers to miracles as authentication of special revelation.
For example, he says "the lzistoriCilI introduction of such a religion [a religion
of reason] may be accompanied and adorned by miracles in order to
announce the end of the earlier religion, which was made authoritative by
miracle. It does so to announce itself as the true religion and the fulfillment
of the old. '" The person who taught us this new religion may be and have
acted in every way as a miracle. The historical account of him may also be
a miracle, supersensible revelation" (R 79). For historical belief, the doctrine of the supermundane nature of that person "would indeed stand in
need of verification through miracles" (R 120).
Such miracles however would have to be verified through historical
inquiry and scholarship, and Kant's hopes for such an inquiry are low. He
states that at the time of the event in question, the resurrection, the
"learned public," namely the Romans, did not look into the new religion at
all until a generation after it occurred and even then did not look into its
beginnings. Therefore the early history of the movement is obscure. The
miracles are not verified (R 120-121, d. 154-155).
Moreover, miracles have, in general, limited value for authentication of
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special revelation. Mracles can be either theistic or demonic in origin. We
could determine that a miracle was not theistic if it authenticated a command which was immoral. We cannot be sure of the opposite however
since "the evil spirit often disguises himself, they say, as an angel of light"
(R 82). When dealing with miracles, reason has, quite plainly, little power
to investigate. Kant goes further to ascribe belief in miracles to superstition
(R 48), and ascribes to the reasonable person a rather skeptical attitude
toward miracles (R 80, cf. 123). In the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant concludes that "No historical account can verify the divine origin of such a
writing"( CF 64). That is, miracles can never be compelling grounds for
asserting external revelation.
Here, though, Kant does not simply throw up his hands. He goes on to
describe what is authenticating for external revelation: "The proof can be
derived only from its tested power to establish religion in the human heart
and, by its very simplicity, to reestablish it in its purity should it be corrupted by various (ancient or modern) dogmas" (CF 64). That is, external
revelation is verified by its agreement with the religion of reason and by its
ability to awaken that religion in the human heart.
While Kant admitted that the religion of the Ideal Man may have been
introduced with miracle, it is no longer in need of such external aids. "But
from now on it is able to maintain itself on rational grounds" (R 79).
Historical belief about Christ would require miracles, but practical belief
about him is self-verifying (R 120, cf. 150). He declares that to need miracles to verify practical belief about the Ideal Man is to display a culpable
lack of moral faith (R 56, 79).
Thus the inability of miracles to authenticate special revelation is covered by the conformity of that revelation with the religion of reason. While
verifying the miracles of both the Old Testament and the New is beyond
our reach, the New Testament has the "great advantage" of coming not as
a statutory but "moral religion, and as thus entering into the closest relation with reason so that, through reason, it was able of itself, without historical learning, to be spread at all times and among all peoples with the
greatest trustworthiness" (R 154-155, emphasis added). In The Conflict of the
Faculties, he concludes that the Bible does in fact meet the requirement he
posed for it:
The Bible contains within itself a credential of its (moral) divinity that
is sufficient in a practical respect-the influence that, as the text of a
systematic doctrine of faith, it has always exercised on the hearts of
human beings, both in catechetical instruction and in preaching. This
is sufficient reason for preserving it, not only as the organ of universal inner rational religion, but also as the legacy (new testament) of a
statutory doctrine of faith which will serve us indefinitely as guiding
line. (CF 64)
Here he does not make an unqualified endorsement; he does not state that
the Bible, as a whole, is straight from the mouth of God. He goes on to say
however that "the divinity of its moral content" compensates for whatever
is human in its narrative, and thus, "that the Bible deserves to be kept, put
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to moral use, and assigned to religion as its guide just as if it is a divine revelation" (CF 65). Though Kant cannot grant that we can know a revelation
is from God, he does grant that there can be sufficient practical grounds to
accept such a claim. Moreover, he grants that there are such grounds for
accepting the Christian Bible as revelation.

The Contingent
Kant's acceptance of the Christian Bible as a credible form of special revelation is not the end of the question. What, we must ask, is the value of such
a revelation? Is belief in it morally required? Are its historical and statutory
aspects binding? Is it necessary for true religion?
It would be difficult to overstate the importance for Kant of universality.
He calls universality "the most important mark of truth" (R 100). He says
that "the token of the true church is its universality; the sign of this, in turn,
is its necessity and its determinability in only one possible way" (R lOS,
emphasis added). Quite obviously all external revelation falls short of this
ideal. It is always particular, always contingent.
Kant recognizes the validity of statutory commandments, that is commandments not knowable by reason a priori. He admits that, in addition to
being served by genuine morality, God may wish to be served in other
ways as well (R 165). He states that the statutory doctrine of the New
Testament will serve indefinitely as a guiding line (CF 64). But notice that
statutory doctrine is a "guiding line" merely, not an "infallible rule" or
something like it. Nor is it universally binding:
For statutory legislation (which presupposes a revelation) can be
regarded merely as contingent and as something which never has
applied or can apply to every man, hence as not binding upon all men
universally. Thus, "not they who say Lord! Lord! but they who do the
will of God," they who seek to become well-pleasing to Him not by
praising Him (or His envoy, as a being of divine origin) according to
revealed concepts which not every man can have, but by a good
course of life, regarding which everyone knows His will-these are
they who offer Him the true veneration which He deserves. (R 95)
In addition, every service rendered to God which is not directly moral
must indirectly serve moral ends (R 165). All others must be abandoned.
For Kant, the statutory never takes precedence over the practical. The
universal always has priority over the particular, the moral over the nonmoral. To reverse the priority is fetishism, and true enlightenment is to
know this proper priority (R 165, 167).

Christoiogy
If the universal always takes precedence over the contingent, what about
Christ? How can Kant endorse the Christian scriptures as revelation, containing as they do, references to Christ's saving work for humanity in history, and at the same time hold the contingent to be of lesser value than the
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universal? To make sense of this, we must look briefly at Kant's
Christology.
Kant repeatedly refers to the Ideal Man as an example for us. He is the
archetype of the human well-pleasing to God, which we are to imitate (R
55-58). We are to "elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection" (R 54,
emphasis added). We are saved by "practical faith in this Son of God";
only in imitation of this exemplar are we to consider ourselves worthy of
divine approval (R 55).
Christians have always considered Christ as an example, but Kant takes
this idea further than traditional theology has allowed. He states that if this
Ideal Man were to have powers we do not, his value as an example for us
would be lessened. If temptation and transgression were impossible for
him, his nature would be so different from ours that he could no longer be
a model for us. Thus we have no reason to attribute to him any sort of
miraculous or divine birth (R 57-58). In addition, the Ideal Man is an idea,
an idea which comes down from heaven to humanity, to be sure, but it is
an idea which is "completely real, in its own right, for it resides in our
morally-legislative reason" (R 54-55). The objective reality of such a person
is unnecessary. "Even though there had never existed an individual who
yielded unqualified obedience to this law, the objective necessity of being
such an one would yet be undiminished and self-evident" (R 56). Thus the
Ideal Man is to have no more power for morality than you or I, and in fact,
he need never have existed.
Traditionally, doctrine regarding the divinity and reality of Christ has
been tied not to Christ as examplar but to Christ as provision for atonement. How, then, does Kant handle atonement? Following his discussion
of the Ideal Man, Kant acknowledges our need for atonement and discusses the manner in which that need might be met. In so doing he uses
Christian terminology to discuss a revolution which every person effects in
herself for herself. While we change our hearts from the evil to the good disposition, we change from the old person to the new. In that process we suffer the punishments which were due to the old person, the guilty person.
And this moral disposition which in all its purity (like unto the purity
of the Son of God) the man has made his own--or, (if we personify
this idea) this Son of God, Himself-bears as vicarious substitute the
guilt of sin for him and indeed for all who believe (practically) in
Him; as savior He renders satisfaction to supreme justice by His sufferings and death; and as advocate 10 He makes it possible for men to
hope to appear before their judge as justified. (R 69)
That is, Kant takes the narrative and terminology of the Christian story, and
rather than making Christ our savior and atonement through vicarious substitution, Kant makes the moral disposition, merely personified in Christ, our
savior and advocate. As we take on the moral disposition, we make atonement for ourselves. We ourselves must effect this change because guilt is
not transmissible, like financial debt; guilt is something "which only the culprit can bear and which no innocent person can assume even though he be
magnanimous enough to wish to take it upon himself for the sake of anoth-
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er" (R 66). Christ not only did not remove our sins by his sufferings and
death, it has always been impossible for him to do so. Thus Christ need be
no more than an idea as an example and as our atoning sacrifice. That idea
we have in practical reason. All that is of value in Christ is universal.
Kant is by no means so satisfied with this account as to think it the
answer to every question. He repeatedly refers to the possibility that we
may not be able to effect, totally, our own atonement and that God may be
required to do something on our behalf. If so, reason tells us that one who
has done everything in his power to satisfy his obligation may hope that
whatever is lacking will be supplied by God "in some way or other." Reason
does not give the manner, and the manner is not important; it is perhaps
even beyond our ability to comprehend (R 159, d. 134). Kant goes on to ask
who is the one with greater faith, the one who trusts that God will do what
is necessary or the one who absolutely insists on knowing how it is done?
Clearly his answer is the former (R 160).
Outside these parameters, expressing faith in Christ does no good whatsoever. He tells us that believing the incomprehensible does not make us
better people. While the historical accounts of Christianity may be entirely
accurate, miracles in themselves, "it is essential that, in the use of these historical accounts, we do not make it a tenet of religion that the knowing,
believing, and professing of them are themselves means whereby we can
render ourselves well-pleasing to God" (R 79-80). Only practical faith in the
moral disposition, personified in the Son of God, is effective and saving faith.

The Necessity of Revelation
For Kant, the historical accounts of Christianity become a teaching tool, a
manner of transmitting the universal saving faith of practical reason. In his
account of the atonement, Kant uses the narrative and terminology of
Christianity to discuss the saving work each person does on his own behalf.
At several points he calls external revelation a "vehicle" for the religion
of reason. Statutory doctrines and laws are the vehicle for that which is
moral (R 95, 97). External revelation occurs first, in time, to demonstrate to
us what we would otherwise have been able to conclude on the basis of
reason (R 143, 97). Scripture still remains because of its manner of communicating, the best way of making the religion of reason comprehensible to
the unlearned (R 152-153, 169). Kant declares that the Bible is the "most
effective organ for guiding human beings to their temporal and eternal
well-being... " (CF 63).1l
Nevertheless, scripture remains a tool, and belief in its claims to external
revelation is not required of anyone. We have already drawn attention to
Kant's claim that universality is the most important mark of truth and that
external revelation can never lay claim to universality (R 100). It can never,
therefore, lay claim to apodictic certainty. He further argues that it is wrong
to compel others to believe something about which they cannot be certain.
Clergy who have themselves become convinced of the truth of a special revelation may not force others to make the same confession (R 175-176). One
may reasonably suppose that Kant held that if it is immoral for clergy to
require this, it may also be immoral for God. Special revelation, "being his-
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torical, can never be required of everyone" (R 99). Most particularly, it cannot be required of the learned, who see all the problems attendant on confirming it (I{ 169). His language could not be stronger on this point:
there arise so many doubts [about an external revelation] ... that to
adopt such a belief as this, subjected as it is to so many controversies
(however sincerely intentioned), as the supreme condition of a universal faith alone leading to salvation, is the most absurd course of
action that can be conceived of. (R 169)
That which is not universal is also not required because it is not necessary. While Kant does not dare to specify the means by which God might
help people to become what they ought, his "reason has just as little insight
as to how something not lying in reason but transcending all reason could
be necessary to the welfare of mankind" (LPT 162-163). We need to know
what we ourselves need to do for our own salvation, but it is not essential
for us to know what God does for us (R 47).
Thus external revelation is a vehicle for the religion of reason. It may
introduce the religion of reason, as did, Kant intimates, Christ. It may be a
teaching tool for the unlearned. It may be a guide to all, indefinitely. It
remains however merely a vehicle. As such, it must be able to cease (R
126). Nothing in it that is not universal can be necessary, and thus all that is
contingent in it must be able to pass away. He defines the true church as
the community of the universal religion of pure reason. The church militant is that church struggling to disencumber itself from the vehicle of historical religion; the church triumphant is the church after that battle has
been won (R 106). The ultimate goal of the true church is to have nothing in
it of the contingent. Its doctrine and laws are to be entirely and thoroughly
universal doctrines and laws of reason.
Kant appears to waver on whether this change will ever take place,
whether the battle will ever actually be won. At one point he writes triumphantly:
Hence a necessary consequence of the physical and, at the same time,
the moral predisposition in us, the latter being the basis and the interpreter of all religion, is that in the end religion will gradually be freed
from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which
rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith
provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at
last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, "so that God may be
all in all." (R 112)
Kant however is not always so confident. Just as he writes that the vehicle
ought to cease and that we ought to labor to set pure religion free from its
shell, he writes also, "Not that it is to cease (for as a vehicle it may perhaps
always be useful and necessary) ... " (R 126). Revelation may always be subjectively necessary; because of "a peculiar weakness of human nature, pure
faith can never be relied on as much as it deserves, that is, a church cannot
be established on it alone" (R 94).
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Kant may sigh when he writes it, but he admits that people want something "sensibly tenable" and that a holy book will always be subjectivelythought not objectively-necessary (R 100, 123). In light of that, and for the
sake of the unlearned, we ought always to teach the historical narrative as
inspiring, but also that true religion consists not in considering what God
has done for us, but what we are to do to make ourselves worthy of God's
assistance (R 123).

The Possibility of Error
Kant allows the acceptance and teaching of the Bible as special revelation,
including treating its statutory elements as a guide. What, then, is his position on error in the Bible? Does he think its historical and statutory elements could contain error?
Clearly he does. "For even the authors of sacred Scripture, being
human, could have made mistakes (unless we admit a miracle running
continuously throughout the Bible) ... " (CF 66). Error may creep in not only
because of the humanity of its authors, but also because of the humanity of
its audience. Scripture is a vehicle "designed to fit in with the creed which
a certain people already held about [moral faith]fI (CF 44). Scripture was
written by and for a specific group of people who already held a certain set
of beliefs about the law of Moses, and scripture is in continuity with those
beliefs. The writers' own beliefs are influenced by that tradition (for example, Paul wrote about the doctrine of election because of his previous
beliefs [CF 661), and the writers attempt to introduce and make credible the
religion of reason to an audience committed to that tradition (R 118, 150).
So its statutory elements can contain error. What about moral elements?
According to Kant, whatever is moral is known to reason. Thus an error in
the moral aspect of the Bible must be something which contradicts practical reason. Kant touches on this possibility when in Religion he discusses
whether or not it is moral to execute a heretic (R 174-175). He states that on
rational grounds "that it is wrong to deprive a man of his life because of his
religious faith is certain .... " He does acknowledge however the "most
remote possibility" of an exception: it is wrong unless "a Divine Will, made
known in extraordinary fashion, has ordered it otherwise." As a possible
instance of this, he refers to the story of Abraham being ordered by God to
"slaughter his own son like a sheep." However, if such a tenet of the
Divine Will is made available to us only through historical documents,
which are written, passed on, and interpreted by people, we can never be
certain of it. Furthermore the same holds even if the order appears to come
directly from God-flit is at least possible that in this instance a mistake has
prevailed." Thus, Kant holds that it is possible for God to order something
contrary to what appears to us to be morally certain, but neither Abraham
nor anyone else can ever be certain that God has in fact issued such an
order. His conclusion is that we are never to act according to special revelation when it commands disobedience to a certain moral duty. While Kant
gives us a clear course of action to follow, he opens up the possibility that
even in its moral contents, scripture can contain error.
j
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Despite the enthusiastic claims of certain Reformers, the Bible is not self
interpreting, and Kant's acknowledgment that it may contain errors underscores the problem of right reading. Kant makes frequent reference to the
fact that scripture must be interpreted and to the manner in which interpretation is to be done. He notes that there will always be a need for scholars versed in the ancient languages and in the historical period (R 104-105).
However such matters, while necessary, are secondary (R 104, CF 66). The
primary matter is interpreting what a scriptural text has to say about
morality.
If a people has been taught to revere a sacred Scripture, the doctrinal
interpretation of that Scripture, which looks to the people's moral
interest-its edification, moral improvement, and hence salvation-is
also the authentic one with regard to its religion: in other words, this
is how God wants this people to understand His will as revealed in
the Bible. (CF 67, d. R 102)

We are to interpret scripture so that it serves as a moral guide and aid to
the people. Thus the religion of reason serves as the highest principle of all
scriptural exegesis (R 100, 102).
We are to interpret scripture in line with the universal religion of pure
reason even when such an interpretation seems, and may actually be,
forced (R 101). He offers a number of reasons for the acceptability of this
procedure. First, he notes that authoritative texts have always been so
interpreted, citing allegorical interpretation of scripture in the church and
of the poets in ancient Greek philosophy. He supports his position with
scriptural texts. That scripture is to serve as a moral guide he finds established in 2 Tim 3:16: "All scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable
for doctrine, for reproof, for improvement, etc." (R 102). From the antitheses in the Sermon on the Mount (You have heard it said ... , but I say... , Matt
5:21ff), he declares it obvious that interpretation according to the religion of
reason is necessary, because literal interpretation (identified with scriptural
scholarship) may lead to wrong conclusions (R 148). As for authorial intention being twisted by a forced interpretation, he states that we need only
admit the possibility that the original author intended such an interpretation. For, he states, the historical element in the text is indifferent and "we
may do with it what we like," even when what we like is forcing on it an
interpretation which seems alien to the text.
He provides many examples of interpretation based on reason, throughout Religion. An extended example is provided in his discussion of the Son
of God and the idea of the moral disposition (Book Two, Section One),
where he takes Christological terminology and narrative to describe how
each person reconciles himself with God. He uses a similar technique to
interpret the story of the Fall (R 36-38). Early on, Kant cites Paul in Eph
6:12, "we wrestle not against flesh and blood (the natural inclinations) but
against principalities and powers-against evil spirits [sic]." While someone reading the text literally might assume that Paul is describing beings
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beyond the world of sense and so something that is beyond our knowledge, Kant declares that is not Paul's meaning. Paul intended "only to
make clear for practical use the conception of what is for us unfathomable"
(R 52). That is, Paul makes clear for our moral benefit the reality of our
inl'isible enemy, radical eviL which is equally our enemy whether it comes
from within or without. For Kant, scripture is not to be interpreted literally.
It is to be interpreted according to reason, even when such interpretation is
forced.

2. Swinburne
In Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, Richard Swinburne argues for the
possibility of divine revelation. Using that work, I will discuss Swinburne's
views in each of the categories discussed for Kant, and in the conclusion
make comparisons between them.

The Assertability of Special Revelation
For Richard Swinburne, revelation in generaL and Christian revelation in
particular, is something someone may rationally assert.
Swinburne acknowledges that if there is no significant prior probability
of Christian doctrines, then one must be very skeptical of Christian revelation. 12 Swinburne argues however that there is prior probability for such
revelation, and he spends much of the book drawing that out. He begins
with evidence for God's existence, which he has assessed elsewhere and
which he concludes is sufficient, though not overwhelming. l3 He then outlines what God might do on behalf of human beings and how God might
reveal himself to us. Swinburne's account of this prior probability looks
very much like what Christian doctrine teaches, for instance that God
might become incarnate and live on our behalf a perfect life in order to
offer us a means of atonement. 14 At the close of his discussion, he states that
"there is some a priori reason to suppose that God will reveal to us those
things needed for our salvation."15 Swinburne does see significant prior
probability of Christian doctrine, and thus some prior probability of
Christian revelation.
But even supposing prior probability, certainly not every purported
revelation is actual. What sort of tests are we to use to determine that
something is revealed? How much evidence is necessary?
Let's begin with the latter question. Swinburne states that if there is evidence that God exists and that he would reveal matters to us, then the evidence required to conclude that a purported revelation is actual is less than
what would be required without such prior evidence. 16 In any case, we
need not be overwhelmed by the evidence before legitimately committing
ourselves to belief. In fact, he states that there is something positive in committing oneself without certainty:
If it is on balance, probable, but no more than probable, that a human
has discovered the way to Heaven, then he will manifest his commitment to the goal of Heaven above all things by pursuing it over a
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period of time when there is some doubt whether his quest will be
successful. Such pursuit will involve a more total commitment to
Heaven-indicate more definitely that that is the goal he chooses
above all-and so thus also be more worthy of reward .... So there is a
priori reason for supposing that the revelation which God provides
will ... not be completely evident even to those who have found it. '?
Here and elsewhere he implies that having a "posterior probability on that
evidence of more than 1/2" is sufficient. 18 The standard is not certainty. All
that is necessary for reasonable assertion is that the evidence makes the
revelation probable.
Swinburne can set such a standard because avoidance of error is not his
primary purpose. He does not state, as do some, that it is best to avoid having wrong beliefs, rather that it is "good to have true beliefs on important
matters."'9 For example, he states that when we make decisions about the
laws of nature, we do so based on available evidence. We could be (and
historically have been) wrong about these laws. A reasonable person however "goes by the available evidence" both in making decisions about natural laws and, by implication, on the genuineness of a purported revelation. 20 The reasonable person need not wait until a matter is certain before
believing it. She may, indeed, make errors, but that does not appear to be
of much moment to Swinburne (and that it ought to be of as much moment
as it is to some is by no means certain). Swinburne's emphasis on having
right beliefs, rather than avoiding wrong ones, lessens the amount of evidence he requires for rational belief.
Nevertheless, some evidence is required. He establishes a prior probability for revelation in general and certain Christian doctrines in particular.
That being done, what evidence could show us that a purported revelation
is on balance probable?
Swinburne proposes internal and external tests. Internal tests examine
the content of the revelation; external tests examine the circumstances
under which it was given. Briefly, the internal tests are:
1. The content must be necessary for our deepest well-being, including:
moral truths; details about what God is like and has done for us which we
need to apply moral truths; and information about the afterlife which we
need to encourage US. 21
2. The content must be true, as far as we are able to determine. It must
not contain material that is certainly immoral. It must not contain, as part
of its central message, factually incorrect information on history or predictions which prove to be false."" Perhaps some portion of it is known to be
true when the purported revelation is examined. In the 20th century, predictions made about the first century can be assessed for truth or falsehood. Perhaps the examiner finds out later that the content was true. For
example, a first century examiner finds that a significant prediction does in
fact come true, or a 20th century examiner finds that a way of life which
initially seemed pointless proves to be exceedingly valuable. 21
3. Any significant revelation will contain information we are unable to
verify. Therefore, truth in what we can verify will be evidence in favor of
the truth of what we cannot. The best of this sort of evidence will be content
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which predicts something only God could know or do. That is, if a purported revelation contains a prediction that God will intervene in history or
nature and that prediction subsequently proves true, this will be significant
evidence in favor of the rest of the content of the purported revelation. 24
External evidence is:
1. The character and behavior of the messenger. The messenger must be
someone who is "generally good" and trustworthy. The messenger's willingness to suffer and even die rather than to deny the message is also evidence in its favor?5
2. The authentication of the revelation by a miracle. 26 For example, he
states, "bringing to life a prophet crucified for saying certain things is par
excellence vindicating that message, declaring it to be true."27
While Swinburne will not himself give a final assessment of the evidence (which he believes is best done by historians), he does go so far as to
state that the Christian revelation makes a stronger claim to be revelation
than the writings of the non-theistic religions, Islam, or even Judaism." For
Christian revelation to be confirmed as revelation, historical evidence for
the resurrection is absolutely necessary. Because, he states, there is prior
reason to think that such an event could occur, the historical evidence need
not be as strong as it otherwise might. Though he does not vouchsafe to
give a detailed assessment of the historical evidence, he names several
pieces of historical evidence which are not much in dispute, including the
willingness of the disciples to die for the message they proclaimed, and it is
clear that he personally finds the evidence to be adequate. 29

The Con ting1'il t and Christoiogy
Universality does not have the importance for Swinburne that it had for
Kant. Whereas Kant elevated to highest place that part of revelation which
could be known to all, Swinburne believes that the deepest sort of revelation tells us things that none of us can know: "For revelation seeks to tell us
deep things that we cannot find out for ourselves-and it would be a fairly
thin revelation if its only role was to suggest things that we could immediately check."311
Part of the important material about which revelation informs us is
what means God has provided for atonement, something which is, in
Swinburne's understanding, a contingent matter. We "need historical
information about how God provided an atonement, and practical information about how we can plead it."'!
Because that must be revealed to us, and there have been many periods
and many different cultures on the earth, God could choose to reveal this
information to every culture in every time, or God could choose to reveal it
to one culture at one time and to give people of that culture the opportunity of transmitting the revelation to people of other cultures. Because there
ought to be only one atonement and because revelation of that atonement
is best given in connection with the event, it seems best that there be just
one revelation, in one culture and one century.32
Swinburne sees in this contingency, not the scandal of particularity, but
the generosity of God in allowing us to participate in our salvation and to
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help our neighbor participate in it." God, in the contingency of his revelation, gives us what Swinburne calls the "opportunity" and "privilege" of a
share in the responsibility of teaching each other about God. Swinburne
considers participation and mutual help to be of high value.

The Necessity of Revelation
On Swinburne's account, revelation is always needed. Whereas Kant
expresses caution about professing knowledge on matters which are
beyond the range of reason, Swinburne emphasizes the importance of having true beliefs on important subjects. God and the afterlife are tremendously important subjects and are both beyond the reach of reason." We
need to know certain moral truths and how to apply them, which without
revelation would be obscure and difficult for us.'s Revelation would not be
fully adequate if it contained only what could be checked by reason. He
writes, "If our need for revelation is as great as I suggested in Chapter 5, it
cannot be so easily dispensed with."36
Swinburne does not comment on belief in revelation being required of
anyone. Rather, he speaks of what would be sufficient warrant to believe it.
He does not discuss what is required of those who live in times or places to
which special revelation is unknown or of those who through no fault of
their own have received only a presentation of special revelation which is
not credible or even of those who have had special revelation presented to
them in a compelling manner. So, while he emphasizes the importance of
revelation in general, he does not state the consequences for the various
groups of people who do not believe it.
Perhaps because Swinburne speaks of believing confirmed revelation as
something "good" and "important," rather than "necessary" or
"required," necessity is not something he claims for it. In the absence however of more explicit comments, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not he
finds belief in special revelation necessary for salvation.

The Possibility of Error
Swinburne divides error into two levels of severity, both of which are contained in the Christian Bible.
The first level is error which is part of the language used to communicate the message, but which is not part of the message itself. It is error
mixed in with the presuppositions of the person or community expressing
the message. This level of error is not a problem. The revelation is to be
judged on its intended message; errors which are part of the expression of
that message but not part of the content are to be disregarded. Swinburne
cites as examples, false scientific presuppositions that the earth is "flat,
square, and stationary."3;
The second level of error is more problematic. At this level, the error is a
part of the actual content of the message. There are genuine conflicts in the
Christian Bible, for example between the "rough justice" of Judges and the
non-violence promoted in the Gospels. 3s While the core of the Old
Testament is worthy of respect, "[wlhat however the modern world has
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become far more conscious of is that some parts of the Old Testament cannot be treated in this way; for they state (and not merely presuppose) historical falsities, or they represent God as behaving immorally."'" This sort
of error is, indeed, consequential. What is to be the response to it?
Swinburne's answer is not entirely clear, and appears inconsistent. His
first comments on the matter are given in his chapter on the tests for revelation. He states:
Generally evidence for and against the truth of the prophet's teaching
must be weighed in the same way as evidence for and against the
truth of any other body of claims .... But in this case lafter sifting out
erroneous presuppositions which are part of the expression but not
content of the message], any falsity at all is enough to dismiss the
whole: earthly witnesses in a criminal trial can make a few mistakes
without their testimony as a whole being regarded as worthless, but
a prophet purporting to have a message from God must be assessed
by more stringent standards.'o
That is, the presence of any genuine error, including the errors of historicity and representations of God acting immorally which he states are in the
message of the Old Testament, would prove that the message in which
they are contained is not genuine revelation.
Swinburne however does not reach this conclusion in his discussion of
the Christian Bible. In particular, he does not make that assertion following
his admission that the Old Testament contains such difficulties. Rather, he
concludes that such elements are to be interpreted metaphorically. He justifies this move on a historical basis. The Church Fathers, in canonizing the
Old Testament, considered it to be interpreted in light of the New, so that
"any parts of the Old Testament which could not be taken straight or historically had to be taken in a purely metaphorical sense, a sense forced on
the book, not bv considerations of the need to make sense of the biblical
book taken on its own, but by the need to make sense of it as a part of a
Christian Scripture."'! This sort of interpretation would be required on
what he terms a "strong view" of inspiration. 42
He provides yet another position, based on a weaker view of inspiration. In this view, the human authors who are the vehicles of divine inspiration are "less than fully pliable. They were not fully open to divine truth,
and allowed some small amount of falsity on important matters to infect
Scripture."43 The same problem could have affected those who created the
canon. In this weaker view of inspiration however our response to the
error is the same as it is for the stronger view: a metaphorical interpretation
of the difficulty.44
Swinburne mentions the strongest and weakest positions on error in the
space of four pages. On page 210, he writes that a purported revelation is
genuine if "none of it was probably false." On page 213, "I have claimed
that there is scope in a revelation for some error and so for some correction
of error." Unfortunately, he does not discuss the relationship between the
two statements, and they appear to be in contradiction. Perhaps he intends
for his readers to accept one or the other of them, but not both. Such an
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intention however is certainly better stated than left implicit. Another possible resolution comes from additional qualifiers to his statement that the
revelation must have no probable errors. Perhaps only certain elements of
it cannot contain errors. Perhaps errors are to be charged to it only after it
has been interpreted by the Church and its inconsistencies have been treated. It would be well for Swinburne to be explicit on this point.

Interpretation of Revelation
Swinburne finds value in an uncertain revelation-it affords opportunity
for its adherents to demonstrate a greater commitment, worthier of
reward. He finds a similar value in uncertainty of expression. If the words
of the revelation are taken as the very words of God, then future generations would find it difficult to remove presuppositions from their expressions which applied only to the culture to which the words were spoken. 's
Future generations would have their hands tied. Instead, there is something to be said for a revelation in which God or his messenger speaks to
others, and they write down the message in their own words. Instead of
one monolithic voice, the revelation is a combination of many voices,
recording the revelation in different ways, "overlapping, stressing different
aspects of revelation, and occasionally contradicting each other."46 Such a
revelation would afford a wide scope for interpretation and for creatively
reapplying the revelation to new situations.
This is, in fact, the sort of revelation we have. In consequence, we are
always in the process of interpreting and reinterpreting it for our own
time. Christianity is always being refined.'7
For Swinburne, the community determines meaning. "The meaning of a
sentence is a public thing, determined by the publicly accessible criteria of
the meanings of words and sentence forms in the language and how context selects among those meanings; not a private thing, determined by the
intention of the speaker."4S The public which determines the meaning of
Christian revelation is the Christian church. In authenticating Jesus' teaching by the resurrection, God authenticated the teaching that the Church
would be "the vehicle of his teachings" and "thereby guaranteed that its
interpretation would be basically correct."49
Recognizing that the Christian Church has split repeatedly, Swinburne
spends much of Chapter 8 discussing which church, if any, has the best
claim to the title "best continuer" of the society Jesus founded, that is
which church is the "true Church." While he suggests the Roman Catholic
Church as a candidate, he also states that there may be no single "best continuer."5o In that case, only interpretations which are agreed to by all
churches with reasonable claims to continuity with the original Church
would be authoritative. s1
Swinburne provides detailed procedures for interpreting the text, and
describing them in any detail would go beyond the scope of this paper. A
few points however are particularly noteworthy. Swinburne recommends
that we read the Bible in three concentric circles: the smallest unit (e.g., a
pericope or poem or other literary unit), the individual book (e.g., Matthew
or Isaiah), and the Bible as a whole. 52 At each level, the context is different,
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and that context will affect meaning. Reading the Bible as a whole particularly affects meaning, because it changes the ultimate author from the
human author of each individual book to God. 54
When one reads the Bible as a whole, with God as the ultimate author,
then one deals with seeming contradictions within the books as one would
do with any single book written by a human author: by attempting to harmonize the two readings, if necessary reading one or the other of the contradictory passages metaphorically.55 However, unless a metaphorical
reading is forced on the text by its context, it is best to read the text in the
most natural or literal manner. 56
In interpreting scripture, the Church need not limit itself to deductive
interpretation, but may develop its understanding by inductively making
explicit what is only implicit in the text. 5' For example, deriving a doctrine
of the Trinity from biblical texts is quite appropriate. 58
For Swinburne, what might be considered authorial intention, say from
the historical-critical viewpoint, may be helpful in understanding a text, but
it does not detemzine a text's meaning. This is so for two reasons. First, meaning is determined by the community, not by the intentions of the speaker or
writer. For example, the reading conventions of Jews in the first century
determine whether a passage in the Old Testament was messianic and
whether or not Jesus fulfilled that prediction; the intentions of its original
author are not the ultimate limits of a text's meaning. 59 This is all the more
true when one views the ultimate author of scripture as God, not the human
author."" He uses the example of Rom 1:4: Christ was "declared to be the son
of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of
the dead." Paul may have had a low Christology, in which Christ was something less than God. He may have believed that Christ was made the Son of
God at the resurrection. However Paul did not use a word which means
specifically and only "made," rather he used the word "declare" (opti;;ro),
which could mean either "made" or "recognized as." Paul "was inspired by
God to write things whose meaning was a little different from what he supposed." That is, though Paul's understanding of Christ may have been different from the author of the Fourth Gospel, God inspired Paul to write in
such a way that the meaning of his sentence is in harmony with John 1. What
Paul himself thought is not determinative of meaning.
61

Conclusion
Having done the groundwork for a comparison, we find that Kant and
Swinburne have much more in common in their views on revelation than
their reputations would lead one to expect. Both recognize the necessity of
special revelation. Swinburne recognizes that we need it because we need
to know matters beyond the scope of reason in order to make good choices
in life. Kant recognizes the power of revelation to speak in the language of
the people and the security the tangible form of a holy book provides to
people who are not wholly satisfied with ethereal reason. Kant and
Swinburne both find it rational to accept a tested revelation and provide
similar tests-namely, miracle and conformity with moral reason.
However they weight these tests quite differently. For Kant, conformity
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with moral reason is the ultimate test, and miracle can be dispensed with.
For Swinburne, revelation cannot be authenticated without miracle, and
though revelation cannot condone what is certainly immoral, Swinburne
spends very little time on the subject. Both Kant and Swinburne recognize
that scripture may contain error, though Swinburne is equivocal here. Both
permit the exegete to force an interpretation on the text, to compel the text
to conform to the (legitimate) needs of the community. For Kant, the purpose of interpretation is to encourage people in leading moral lives.
Swinburne is concerned to create a dynamic, systematic theology, which is
both appropriate for each generation and internally consistent. While both
of them give a nod in that direction, neither is terribly concerned about the
intentions of the human authors of scripture. Instead, they are concerned
that the text be used effectively to meet the needs of the contemporary
community. Both realize that, as radical as this may appear, it is nothing
new; the Church has approached the scriptures this way from the beginning. The critical similarity between them, though, is that they both recognize that humans, because of their limitations, need revelation and that it is
reasonable to believe a purported revelation if it passes certain tests. And
in this, Kant goes beyond Swinburne in unequivocally asserting that the
Christian Bible does indeed pass.
Their common views however do not negate their differences. As one
might expect, their differences are particularly telling. Swinburne is concerned with authenticated interpretation via the Church, as a community,
which preserves the original revelation through tradition. Kant is concerned with individual autonomy and each individual's responsibility to
decide for himself what to believe and how to read. Kant strongly opposes
the sort of ecclesiastical power inherent in Swinburne's interpretive
scheme.
Kant values Christian scripture primarily because of its conformity, in
his view, with the universal religion of reason. We get closer to its truth as
we peel away from it whatever is beyond the reach of unassisted reason.
For Kant, external revelation is an aid to internal revelation, the revelation
of reason. Going back to his image of the concentric circles, the circle of
external revelation is indeed the larger circle, but the only portion of that
circle which is genuinely important is within the inner circle, the revelation
of reason. The rest is mere "vehicle," or worse, dead weight. Swinburne
concludes quite the opposite. He tells us that revelation is meant to tell us
what is beyond the reach of reason, that is its purpose.
Their difference here reflects their different attitudes toward the contingent, the particular. For Swinburne, God's relationship with humanity is
lived out in history. God provides for our atonement in history, in one culture in one century. God develops our understanding of him and of our
relationship to him via a particular community in time. For Swinburne, to
recognize this realization through history, this contingency, is merely to
recognize the human situation, within, not outside of, time and culture. For
Kant, the particular is a danger. It, by definition, is available only to some.
If it is necessary for our salvation, then some go without what is necessary.
How can a just God withhold what is necessary for someone's salvation?
Kant is also concerned with what sort of beliefs can be justly required of
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rational beings. One can never be certain that one is hearing a revelation
from God. Even with the confirmation of the most extraordinary miracle,
even if the host of heaven should appear, singing God's praises, there is
always the possibility of error, of deception of some kind or other. Can
belief in something uncertain be required? Kant answers emphatically no.
In this particular issue, we see some of what is best and worst in both of
them. Kant, a man of the Enlightenment, firmly believes in the capacity of
human beings, as rational beings, to rise above the limitations of self and
culture to reach the universaL That sort of optimism does not hold in our
own period. Swinburne recognizes the limitations we all labor under. We
are always subject to the contingent. There are very few universals of reason or anything else, certainly not enough of them to make sound choices
in life. Swinburne recognizes that we will always need God's external
assistance to learn matters of great importance to us. Revelation is not just
a method for teaching us what we could have figured out for ourselves.
Revelation is a method of teaching us what we otherwise have no power to
grasp and we very much need to know.
But Swinburne, for all his enthusiasm for the goodness and importance
of revelation, entirely neglects the question Kant so relentlessly asks: what
about those who do not accept this revelation? Is accepting revelation necessary for salvation? Swinburne cannot be excused from answering the
question. It is still more a question of our own time than it was of Kant's.
Christians and non-Christians alike ask the question. Official Church bodies ask the question. That Swinburne does not is a glaring omission. His
Christian philosophy cannot be called reasonably complete until he
addresses the issue.
Kant is concerned to make salvation available to everyone. He rightly
recognizes the scandal of damning someone for eternity based on something or some lack which was not at all her fault. "The very man who has
the temerity to say: He who does not believe in this or that historical doctrine as sacred truth, that man is damned, ought to be able to say also: If
what I am now telling you is not true, let me be damned!" (R 178) Kant
knows that the boldest of us would scarcely dare to make such a declaration. But does that make necessary his conclusion that the true church will
become the church triumphant only when it rids itself of everything in special revelation which does not belong to the general revelation of reason? Is
it not possible that the church will be truly triumphant when all its members know, recognize, and celebrate what God has done for them in history? Do Kant's arguments support his declaration that we cannot be held
responsible for believing anything unless it is apodictically certain? Is God
obligated to cater to the skeptic? Do we not also have an obligation to
respond to whatever evidence God graciously permits us to receive?
Indeed, as Kant points out, we ought to tremble to declare that others or
we ourselves ought to be damned on the basis of particular historical
beliefs. But still more ought we to tremble not to respond to God's gracious
self-revelation. To see something of God and to turn away is dreadful
indeed, something for which we cannot hope to excuse ourselves with
protestations about apodictic certainty. From all that we are able to understand of justice, if God is just, then he must provide for all people whatever
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means are absolutely necessary for their salvation. However what is necessary may be provided for us in the form of external revelation and particular historical beliefs. Furthermore, more than the minimum requirements
may be available to particular people in time. God may make available to
some a greater abundance of goodness, a greater abundance or earlier
knowledge of means. God is well within the bounds of justice to require
positive use of such means. "From everyone to whom much has been
given, much will be required; and from the one to whom much has been
entrusted, even more will be demanded" (Luke 12:48, NRSV).
Yet, for all his reluctance to require acceptance of scripture of others,
Kant's own acceptance of and respect for it is evident. Hare draws out how
much Kant's pietistic upbringing provides the paradigm for his religion of
reason. 62 Kant evidently recognizes in scripture the Ideal Man.
Kant remarks, dryly, that scripture is held in high respect most of all
among those who do not read it (R 98). His frequent quotations of scripture
indicate he is not one of those. Nor do his comments about the pure religion of reason drown out his comments about scripture's power to teach
us about God or morality.
At minimum, we may say that Kant holds that belief in revelation, as
long as it does not conflict with practical reason and the moral disposition,
is acceptable and beneficial:
Whatever, as the means or the condition of salvation, I can know not
through my own reason but only through revelation, and can incorporate into my confession only through the agency of an historical
faith, and which, in addition does not contradict pure moral principles-this I cannot, indeed, believe and profess as certain, but I can as
little reject it as being surely false; nevertheless, without determining
anything on this score, I may expect that whatever therein is salutary
will stand me in good stead so far as I do not render myself unworthy of it through defect of the moral disposition in good life-conduct.
In this maxim there is genuine moral certainty .... (R 177)
But one may reasonably say more. Perhaps the analogy is best drawn from
Kant's attitude toward the physico-theological proof. He cannot accept this
argument as a proof. It does not answer all questions. Neither does he dismiss it.
This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the
oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason
of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as itself derives its
existence and gains ever new vigour from that source. It suggests
ends and purposes, where our observation would not have detected
them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature by means of the
guiding-concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside
nature. This knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the
idea which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme
Author that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction.
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It would therefore not only be uncomforting but utterly vain to

attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this argument.
Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing evidence, which,
though empirical, is yet so powerful, cannot be so depressed through
doubts suggested by subtle and abstruse speculation, that it is not at
once aroused from the indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from
a dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of
the universe-ascending from height to height up to the all-highest,
from the conditioned to its conditions, up to the supreme and unconditioned Author. (PR 520)
Such are Kant's views on an argument he rejects as a proof. It is reasonable
to conclude that his views on scripture are similar. It teaches us. It enlivens
reason. It, though empirical, is yet so powerful that it upholds reason,
sometimes depressed through speculative doubts, and lifts it to the
supreme and unconditioned Author. Kant clearly held that one may be
introduced to the religion of pure reason through special revelation (R 79).
Perhaps John Hare is right in his belief that Kant regarded himself as such
an one. 6l
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